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Noncompetes and Other Post-Employment
Restraints on Competition: Empirical Evidence
from Trade Secret Litigation
CHRISTOPHER B. SEAMAN†
Noncompete clauses in employment agreements are both common and controversial. An
estimated twenty-eight million Americans—nearly twenty percent of the U.S. workforce—are
currently bound by a noncompete. The traditional view that noncompete agreements can facilitate
increased productivity by encouraging employers to invest in employee training has been
challenged by numerous legal and economics scholars in recent years, who contend noncompetes
hinder employment options for skilled workers and limit information spillovers, which are both
vital drivers of innovation. Based on these claims, several states have recently limited the
enforcement of noncompetes, and legislation is pending at the federal level to effectively ban
noncompete agreements for certain types of workers.
Despite their widespread use, empirical research regarding noncompetes is fragmented and
incomplete. In particular, there have been few empirical studies based on actual employment
agreements. This Article helps fill an important gap in the existing literature. Using a novel
dataset of noncompete agreements that have been publicly disclosed in trade secret litigation in
federal court, it finds that noncompetes are more frequently enforced against technical and sales
personnel, instead of high-ranking corporate executives. In addition, it finds that noncompetes
are common for employees with a base salary below $100,000 per year and that California-based
employees are significantly less likely to be bound by a noncompete. The implications of these
and other findings from the dataset are discussed in the final Part of the Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Contractual provisions that limit an employee’s ability to compete with a
former employer are both common and controversial.1 An estimated twentyeight million employees—nearly twenty percent of the U.S. labor force—are
currently bound by a noncompete agreement.2 Although existing research
suggests covenants not-to-compete and other post-employment restraints on
competition, such as non-solicitation agreements, are more common among
highly-skilled employees,3 they occur at all levels of the workforce. News stories
have highlighted the use of noncompetes in low-wage, low-skill positions,4
including fast food employees,5 pet sitters,6 beauticians,7 exterminators,8 camp

1. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of
Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2015)
(“Restrictive covenants remain controversial today, even as they have seemingly proliferated among
employers.”) (footnote omitted); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2001) (explaining that “restrictive covenant[s] prohibit[ing] an
employee from competing with the employer within a certain geographic area for a specified time period after
departure” are “an increasingly common feature of employment, used across a wide range of industries,
occupations, and employees”); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with
Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010) (“As the use of noncompetes has become
more widespread, controversy over these agreements has also increased.”).
2. Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompete Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force, J.L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625714.
3. Id. at 6–7.
4. See Sophie Quinton, These Days, Even Janitors Are Being Required to Sign Non-Compete Clauses,
USA TODAY (May 27, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/27/noncompeteclauses-jobs-workplace/348384001 (“Big companies often ask top executives who have access to confidential
business information to sign noncompete agreements. But low-wage, unskilled laborers such as janitors,
landscapers and entry-level health workers are often asked to sign them, too.”).
5. In one well-publicized example, the sandwich chain Jimmy John’s required its “sandwich makers” to
agree not to work at a “competitor” (which it broadly defined as any business that “derives more than ten percent
(10%) of its revenue from selling submarine, hero-type, deli-style, pita and/or wrapped or rolled sandwiches”
that is “located with [sic] three (3) miles” of any Jimmy John’s store) for two years after employment. Dave
Jamieson, Jimmy John’s Makes Low-Wage Workers Sign ‘Oppressive’ Noncompete Agreements, HUFFPOST
(Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jimmy-johns-non-compete_n_5978180. After litigation,
Jimmy John’s agreed that it would not enforce noncompetes for all current and former employees and to remove
them from training materials for new hires. See Samantha Bomkamp, Jimmy John’s Agrees to Pay $100,000 to
Illinois AG over Noncompete Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 2016, 2:11 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-jimmy-johns-settlement-1208-biz-20161207-story.html.
6. See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, Doggy Day Care Chain Makes Pet Sitters Sign Noncompetes to Protect
‘Trade Secrets’, HUFFPOST (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:31 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/camp-bowwow_n_6207544; see also Paw Shop, LLC v. Mestre, No. 601950/08, 2008 WL 8675213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
28, 2008) (granting a preliminary injunction that prohibited a former employee from providing dog walking
services to owners whose pets were serviced by the plaintiff within a ten mile radius of the former employer’s
stores based on a noncompete agreement).
7. See, e.g., Koby Levin, As Non-Compete Agreements Proliferate, So Do Lawsuits, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/70f0855282de4329908957fa7b1e278d (describing a noncompete
that prevented a hair stylist in Missouri from accepting a position with another salon).
8. See, e.g., Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925–26 (Va. 1989) (upholding a
noncompete agreement prohibiting a pest control worker from working for a competitor for two years after
termination of employment), overruled by Home Paramount Pest Control Companies, Inc. v. Shaffer, 718 S.E.2d
762 (Va. 2011).
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counselors,9 and college interns.10 These restraints may adversely impact
workers’ ability to negotiate with their existing employer and to switch
positions, potentially depressing wages and decreasing labor mobility.11
There are divergent theories regarding the impact of noncompetes and
other post-employment restraints on innovation. The historically dominant view
is that noncompetes can facilitate innovation by incentivizing firms to invest in
employee training, fostering the dissemination of information within the firm,
and preventing the unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets and other valuable
business information.12 Under this approach, the reasonableness standard for
evaluating the enforceability of noncompetes13—which remains the
predominant approach in most jurisdictions14—adequately protects their
benefits to employers while also reducing the negative impact on employees by
constraining contractual overreach.
More recently, however, some legal and economics scholars contend that
noncompete agreements are generally detrimental to innovation. For example,
in a well-known and influential study, Ronald Gilson compared innovation in
California’s Silicon Valley to Massachusetts’s Route 128 corridor and attributed
Silicon Valley’s success to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes in most
circumstances.15 Building on this work, scholars like Orly Lobel and Viva
Moffat have argued that noncompete agreements and other post-employment
restraints unduly hinder employment options for skilled workers, who are a
critical source of talent and new ideas.16 In their view, noncompetes effectively
9. See, e.g., Steve Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES
(June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-inarray-of-jobs.html (describing a noncompete clause that prohibited a nineteen-year-old college student from
working as a camp counselor at a nearby competing camp).
10. See, e.g., Jack Chapman, What If They Want Me to Sign a Non-Compete Agreement?, LADDERS (Feb.
27,
2020),
https://www.theladders.com/career-advice/they-want-me-to-sign-a-non-compete-agreement
(describing a case where a college student was blocked from accepting employment with the client of an
advertising agency that she had interned with due to a noncompete agreement).
11. See WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND
STATE RESPONSES 2 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_
final2.pdf.
12. See generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960);
Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980);
Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1981).
13. The reasonableness standard for noncompetes can be traced to the landmark English decision in Mitchel
v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. Wms. 181. See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, The Case for
Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 958 (2020).
14. California is the obvious counterexample. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); ANNALEE SAXENIAN,
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). But see
Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 978–1007 (critiquing conventional views of the Silicon Valley versus
Route 128 comparison and suggesting that other legal constraints on labor mobility, such as trade secret and
ERISA litigation, undermine this narrative).
16. See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS,
AND FREE RIDING (2013); Moffat, supra note 1, at 893–97; Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes
Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 984 (2012).
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serve as human capital controls.17 Ultimately, critics of noncompetes argue that
they stifle rather than promote innovation, which in turn can negatively impact
economic growth.18 In addition, some economists and business law scholars
have conducted studies which suggest that noncompetes adversely affect the
mobility of skilled labor.19 In light of these critiques, legislation has been
introduced in Congress to significantly restrict the enforcement of
noncompetes,20 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently held a public
hearing regarding their potential anticompetitive effects.21 Furthermore,
numerous states recently have enacted laws curtailing noncompetes, often by
prohibiting their application to lower-income workers.22

17. See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual
Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 790 (2015) (describing “postemployment restrictions, including noncompetition
contracts, nonsolicitation, nonpoaching, and antidealing agreements” as forms of “contractual controls on human
capital”); Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? Non-Competes and the Limits of IP
Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903, 907 (2017) (“The subject matter of non-competes is people—human
beings—and the goal of those agreements is to control that human capital.”).
18. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan NonCompete Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009) (using change in noncompete law in Michigan during the 1980s
as a natural experiment and finding a statistically significant decrease in labor mobility among Michigan
inventors) [hereinafter Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment]; Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh & Lee
Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-Compete Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 394
(2015) (finding that noncompetes drive skilled worked to states that decline to enforce such agreements)
[hereinafter Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage?]; Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants:
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425 (2011).
20. See, e.g., Workforce Mobility Act of 2020, H.R. 5710, 116th Cong. (2020); Workforce Mobility Act
of 2019, S. 2614, 116th Cong. (2019); Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S. 2782, 115th Cong. (2018); Workforce
Mobility Act of 2018, H.R. 5631, 115th Cong. (2018).
21. Non-Competes in the Workplace: Examining Antitrust and Consumer Protection Issues, FED. TRADE
CMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/non-competes-workplace-examining-antitrustconsumer-protection-issues (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
22. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 925 (West 2021) (prohibiting employers from entering into choice of forum or
choice of law agreements with California workers); S.B. 3163, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (codified at 820
ILL. COMP. STAT. 90 et seq. (2017)) (prohibiting employers from entering into noncompetes with low-wage
workers); ME. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 599-A to 599-B (2019) (prohibiting noncompetes where the employee’s wages
are at or below 400% of the federal poverty level); S.B. 328, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019) (codified at MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-716 (West 2021)) (prohibiting noncompetes for employees earning $15 an hour
or less, or $31,200 per year); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24L (2021) (prohibiting noncompetes for non-exempt
employees, interns, and employees 18 years old or younger, and limiting most noncompetes to one year in
duration); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.195 (2020) (requiring employers to offer valuable consideration for
noncompetes); S.B. 197, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2019) (codified at N.H. REV. STAT. § 275.70-a (2020))
(prohibiting noncompetes for employees who earn an hourly rate equal to or less than 200 percent of the federal
minimum wage); H.B. 2992, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295
(2020)) (limiting noncompetes by, inter alia, requiring employers to inform employees at least two weeks before
starting work that a noncompete is required, the employee must made more than four times the median family
income as calculated by the Census Bureau, and the duration of the noncompete agreement is limited to 18
months following termination of employment); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-59-3 (2020) (similar to Massachusetts);
S.B. 480, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:8 (2021)) (prohibiting
noncompetes for certain low-wage employees); H.B. 1450, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.62.020–.030 (2021)) (prohibiting noncompetes against employees making equal to or
less than $100,000 and independent contractors making equal to or less than $250,000 annually, and presuming
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Despite their importance, existing empirical research regarding the scope,
frequency, and impact of noncompete agreements and other post-employment
restraints on competition remains fragmented and incomplete.23 Moreover,
many of the empirical studies conducted thus far have significant limitations
based on the methodologies and data sources used, a focus on particular types
of employees (for example, CEOs and doctors), and/or the timing of the study.24
In particular, very few studies “examin[e] the terms of actual employment
contracts” regarding noncompetes because “employment contracts are not
generally publicly available.”25
This Article aims to make a substantial, new contribution to the growing
but inchoate body of empirical research regarding noncompetes and other postemployment restraints. Specifically, it uses a hitherto-untapped data source:
breach of employment contract claims asserted as part of trade secret litigation
in federal court under the Defend Trade Secrets Act.26 Using this resource, the
Author created an original dataset of over 500 noncompete agreements and other
contractual limitations on post-employment competition. Each of these
agreements were then hand coded for a variety of information, including the
employee’s job position, his or her salary, the duration and scope of the
noncompete clause, and the relevant governing law.
Several interesting findings emerge from this dataset, including that half of
post-employment restraints on competition in trade secret litigation involve
claims against technical, engineering, customer service, or sales staff, rather than
high-ranking corporate executives, and that over a quarter of noncompetes apply
to employees who have a base salary of $100,000 per year or less. This study
also found evidence supporting the existence of the so-called “California effect”;
namely, that employment agreements covering California employees are
substantially less likely to include a covenant not-to-compete. Instead,
that any noncompete with a duration exceeding 18 months after termination of employment is unreasonable and
unenforceable).
23. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 10 (“Despite the heated discussion of the pros and cons of restrictive
covenants . . . there are few empirical studies examining these agreements to provide evidence and guidance for
businesses, employees, or policymakers.”); Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete
Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497, 500 (2016) (“[T]he existing legal and empirical research on the
prevalence and impacts of noncompetes in the U.S. labor market remains piecemeal and unsatisfactory.”); J.J.
Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete
Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 372 (“[W]e know surprisingly little about the frequency, scope,
and strength of noncompetition agreements across the country.”).
24. See Bishara et al., supra note 1 (reporting the results of a sample of employment contracts for Chief
Executive Officers of large, publicly-traded firms disclosed in federal securities filings); Kurt Lavetti, Carol
Simon & William D. White, The Impacts of Restricting Mobility of Skilled Service Workers: Evidence from
Physicians, 55 J. HUM. RES. 1025 (2020) (reporting results form a 2007 survey of physicians regarding
noncompete clauses by state and employment status); Prescott et al., supra note 23 (using self-reported responses
from an online survey); Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment
Contracts, 15 J. CORP. L. 483 (1990) (studying a sample of appellate decisions on noncompete agreements from
the 1960s and 1980s).
25. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 10, 24.
26. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376.
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California firms appear to rely on non-solicitation agreements—which prohibit
an employee from lobbying customers or recruiting employees or their former
employer—as a substitute. Ultimately, the methodology used for this study can
serve as a springboard for future research regarding not just noncompetes, but a
variety of contractual provisions that may affect innovation policy, such as
nondisclosure agreements and invention assignment clauses.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
overview of the various types of contractual provisions that may limit an
employees’ ability to compete with their former employer. It then discusses the
various theories regarding the role of covenants not-to-compete in innovation
policy and the development of human capital. Next, it summarizes the existing
empirical research regarding noncompetes, including the limitations of prior
research. Part II describes the research objectives, study design, and data
collection process for this empirical research project. It also notes several
potential methodological limitations of this study. Part III explains the key
findings from the dataset. Finally, Part IV discusses some implications of these
results and potential directions for future research.

I. POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS ON COMPETITON
AND INNOVATION POLICY
A. AN OVERVIEW OF POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRAINTS
Employers have used contract law to limit the ability of former employees
to compete against them for hundreds of years.27 While employed, a worker is
bound by various legal doctrines that prevent against unfair competition with the
employer, such as the duty of loyalty.28 But once a job ends—regardless of the
reason—these duties terminate, and “the departing employee is generally free to
engage in any lawful competition.”29 As a result, “[t]he employee’s valuable
knowledge, skills, and relationships walk out the door when the employee
leaves.”30
27. See Blake, supra note 12, at 626 (noting covenants not to compete “comprise one of the traditional
common-law ‘restraints of trade’ and present problems which have kept them before the courts for more than
five hundred years”); see also id. at 629–37 (discussing English case and statutory law regarding postemployment covenants dating back to the 1400s).
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2015) (“Employees in a
position of trust and confidence with their employer owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer in matters
related to their employment.”); id. § 8.01(b)(2) (providing that “competing with the employer while employed
by the employer” is a breach of this duty); see also Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty
Provision, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 400 (2012) (“Employees can . . . be seen as agents, and the duty
of loyalty generally requires that employees not harm their employer.”).
29. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 11; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.05 (“A
former employee may compete with, or work for, a competitor of the former employer . . . unless: (a) the former
employee is bound by an agreement not to compete . . . or (b) . . . the former employee discloses, uses, or by
words or conduct threatens to disclose or use, specifically identifiable trade secrets of the former
employer . . . .”).
30. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 11.
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Understandably, employers are reluctant to let such talent and knowledge
voluntarily depart, potentially to the benefit of a competitor. One tool to prevent
this is contractual restraints on post-employment competition, which can
“temporarily maintain the status quo that existed prior to the employee’s
departure,” thus effectively retaining the employer’s “competitive advantage by
contract,” at least for a limited time.31 Post-employment restraints also can
prevent an employee from misappropriating trade secrets (and other confidential
business information) by disclosing or using this information to the former
employer’s detriment.32 But these same restraints also can interfere with
individuals’ personal autonomy and right to earn a living.33 In addition, because
noncompete agreements and other post-employment restraints are facially
anticompetitive, they may negatively impact social welfare by reducing
entrepreneurship, depressing employee wages and job satisfaction, and
preventing the sharing of knowledge and ideas.34
There are several types of contractual post-employment restraints on
competition.35 The first, and perhaps best known, is a covenant not-to-compete
(CNC).36 CNCs prohibit an employee from joining a competitor or starting a

31. Id. at 12.
32. Blake, supra note 12, at 627 (“From the point of view of the employer, postemployment restraints are
regarded as perhaps the only effective method of preventing unscrupulous competitors or employees from
appropriating valuable trade information . . . for their own benefit.”).
33. See LOBEL, supra note 16, at 37 (“From the perspective of labor advocates, every man and woman
should have the right to earn a living and pursue their profession, and noncompetes . . . and other forms of human
capital controls are heavy infringements upon the pursuit of that livelihood and therefore upon happiness.”);
Moffat, supra note 17, at 911–12 (exploring the impact of noncompetes on employees’ “personal autonomy and
dignitary interests”).
34. See LOBEL, supra note 16; Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2015) (noting that noncompetes “interfere
with the flow of information that naturally results when employees change firms,” which some scholars argue
“play a critical role in spurring innovation”); Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as
a Category of Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 89 (2011) (contending that
“the non-compete implicitly reflects a policy determination that” protecting employers from trade secret
misappropriation “outweighs the potential social gains obtained through innovation, and the compensation and
job satisfaction of individual employees who freely join or form competing businesses”); Moffat, supra note 17,
at 917 (“Employees bound by non-competes tend to have less bargaining power and lower wages or salaries
than those free of restriction.”); Christina L. Wu, Comment, Noncompete Agreements in California: Should
California Courts Uphold Choice of Law Provisions Specifying Another State’s Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593,
609 (2003) (“Competition among employers for employees leads to better wages and working conditions for
employees, because employers feel obliged to give their employees good working environments and salaries to
induce them to stay.”). In their seminal treatise on the economics of intellectual property law, William Landes
and Richard Posner admit that “[i]t is not even clear that enforcing employee covenants not to compete generates
social benefits in excess of its social costs.” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 371 (2003).
35. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 12 (“There are several typical contract mechanisms employers use to
restrict or penalize an employee’s postemployment competition.”).
36. “CNC” appears to be the most common abbreviation in the recent legal and economic literature on
covenants not-to-compete. Some articles use “NCA” as an alternative abbreviation. See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen
& Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and Trade Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
438, 440 (2017).
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new firm that would compete with the former employer.37 Many CNCs also
prevent former employees from consulting or providing other assistance to a
competitor that falls short of a formal employee/employer relationship.38 In
addition, CNCs usually preclude an employee from serving as a director or
officer for, or taking a substantial ownership interest in, a competing firm.39
CNCs are often expressly limited in time (duration) and geographic scope,40 and
some CNCs may also preclude the former employee from engaging in specific
activities.41
In most states, CNCs are enforceable if they are reasonable.42 Under this
“rule of reason” approach, courts generally apply the test articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which provides that:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is
ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in
restraint of trade if
(a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the [employer]’s
legitimate interest, or
(b) the [employer]’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the
[employee] and the likely injury to the public.43

As a result, CNCs are unreasonable if they are “more extensive in duration,
geographical area, or type of activity than necessary to protect the employer’s
[legitimate] interest.”44 Legitimate interests may include protecting valuable and

37. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 260 (“A covenant-not-to-compete forbids a departing employee from
competing with a former employer either as an employee of an established rival firm or by starting a new firm.”);
see Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 504 (“Covenants not to compete are a post-employment restrictive
covenant between an employer and an employee that prohibits the employee from going to work for a competitor
or otherwise competing with the former employer.”); see also Covenant Not to Compete, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A promise, usu. in a sale-of-business, partnership, or employment contract, not
to engage in the same type of business for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.”).
38. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 37 (reporting that fifty-four percent of surveyed CEO contracts
contain a CNC that “specifically prohibit entering a consulting agreement with a competitor”).
39. See Noncompete, Executive Compensation (CCH) ¶ 415 (2018), 2018 WL 2269228 (“Most noncompete provisions contain fairly standard language that the employee or former employee cannot directly or
indirectly own any interest in, operate, control or participate as a partner, director, principal, officer, or agent
of . . . any company, person, or entity engaged in a competitive business. However, most non-competes also
provide that: ‘Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, this Section shall not prevent the Employee from
acquiring securities representing up to [1% – 5%] of the outstanding voting securities of any publicly held
corporation.’”).
40. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 33 tbl.5, 36 tbl.7 (providing data on geographic and temporal limits
on CNCs for CEO employment agreements).
41. See Whitmore, supra note 24, at 512–14 (discussing activity restraints in CNCs).
42. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 261. See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO
COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (11th ed. 2017).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
44. Emily J. Kuo, The Enforceability Gap of Covenants Not Compete in Telecommuting Employment
Relationships, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 571 (1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188
cmt. d (“The extent of the restraint is a critical factor in determining its reasonableness. The extent may be
limited in three ways: by type of activity, by geographical area, and by time.”); RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 8.06 (AM. L. INST. 2015) (providing that a CNC “is enforceable only if it is reasonably tailored in scope,
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confidential business information, customer goodwill, and unique skills or
training.45 One of the most common rationales for CNCs is “the protection of
intellectual property, especially trade secrets.”46 Because trade secret protection
can be easily lost—for example, by accidental or intentional disclosure by a
former employee—courts are often deferential to employer claims that CNCs
should be enforced to protect trade secret information.47
In contrast, a minority of states, most notably California,48 generally refuse
to enforce CNCs under the public policy of favoring workers’ freedom of
mobility.49 The relevant California statue, section 16600 of the Business and
Professions Code, states: “Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or
business of any kind is to that extent void.”50 As a result, the California Supreme
Court has held that this law “prohibits employee noncompetition agreements
unless the agreement falls within a statutory exception.”51 Several other states,
including Illinois and Oregon, limit CNCs to particular categories of workers.52
Another type of restrictive covenant is a non-solicitation agreement
(NSA).53 NSAs prevent departing employees from soliciting business from their
geography, and time to further a protectable interest of the employer,” with certain narrowly delineated
exceptions such as employer bad faith or material breach of contract).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b; see also RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
§ 8.07 (listing “trade secrets . . . and other protectable confidential information that does not meet the definition
of [a] trade secret,” “customer relationships,” “investment in the employee’s reputation in the market,” and the
“purchase of a business owned by the employee” as legitimate interests for a CNC).
46. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 261; see also Outsorce Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 670 (7th
Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The clearest case for [CNCs] is where the employee’s work gives him access
to the employer’s trade secrets.”); Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 36, at 456 (“[T]he protection of trade secrets
has long been considered a legitimate business interest that can justify a[] [CNC].”).
47. See Sandeen & Rowe, supra note 36, at 447 (suggesting that courts are deferential to employers’
assertions that CNCs are necessary to protect their alleged trade secrets, “even though the requirements for trade
secret protection have become more exacting since adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act”).
48. Other states that generally refuse to enforce CNCs are North Dakota and Oklahoma. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 9-08-06 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219A (2021).
49. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 292 (Ct. App. 2002) (“Business and Professions
Code section 16600 generally prohibits covenants not to compete, and California public policy strongly favors
employee mobility.”); see also Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 14–15; Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 264.
Some courts have recognized that California law may permit post-employment restraints on competition if it is
“necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets.” Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Frame Network, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelly Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal.
1965)); see also Barnett & Sichleman, supra note 13, at 984 (“Section 16600 does not preclude an employer
from preventing a departing employee via injunctive relief from joining a new employer by enforcing
nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, or other similar postemployment obligations when doing so promotes the
employer’s interest in protecting its trade secrets.”).
50. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2021).
51. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288 (Cal. 2008).
52. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/5 (2017) (prohibiting CNCs for employees who make less than $13 per
hour or the minimum wage under applicable law); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 653.295, 653.020 (2020) (limiting CNCs
to certain employees, including individuals who engage in salaried “professional work” and perform
“predominantly intellectual, managerial, or creative tasks”).
53. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 7 (describing NSAs as a “subcategory of CNCs”). But NSAs are typically
much narrower than CNCs in that they do not prevent most or all competition with the former employer—
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former employer’s clients and/or attempting to hire their employees for a
specific period of time.54 The latter type of NSA (prohibiting the solicitation of
employees) is sometimes called a non-poaching or non-raiding clause.55 Like
CNCs, NSAs may be justified based upon the employer’s legitimate interests in
protecting its goodwill and confidential business or trade secret information,
such as customer lists and preferences.56 But because NSAs are more limited in
scope than CNCs—they prohibit only certain types of post-employment
conduct—some states that generally refuse to enforce CNCs may permit NSAs
if they further an employer’s legitimate interest and are reasonable in scope.57
Many employment agreements also contain non-disclosure agreements
(NDAs) requiring that employees keep confidential trade secrets and other
valuable business information that is not widely known.58 NDAs that restrict the
instead, they only prohibit certain types of conduct. In addition, some jurisdictions that largely prohibit CNCs
are substantially more permissive of NSAs. See infra note 57 and sources cited therein.
54. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 12 (describing NSAs as “related to pursuing clients and recruiting
other employees”); Erin E. Gould, Comment, Read the Fine Print: A Critical Look at Oregon’s Noncompete
and Nonsolicitation Agreement Laws, 88 OR. L. REV. 515, 519 (2009) (“[N]onsolicitation
agreements . . . prohibit an employee from soliciting business from the employer’s customer list, soliciting
employment from the employer’s current employees, or both.”).
55. See, e.g., PrecisionIR Inc. v. Clepper, 693 F. Supp. 2d 286, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (non-raiding); Greg
T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave: A Possible Solution to the Uncertain Enforceability of Restrictive
Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2295 n.16 (2002) (non-poaching).
56. See Jerrick Robbins, Comment, A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma: Soliciting the Use of
Non-Solicitation Agreements, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1227, 1254–56 (2017) (contending that NSAs “promote an
employer’s goodwill by preventing an employee from drawing away the customers and other employees that
partially define this goodwill” and may help protect an employer’s customer lists).
57. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 219B (2021) (“A contract or contractual provision which prohibits an
employee or independent contractor of a person or business from soliciting, directly or indirectly, actively or
inactively, the employees or independent contractors of that person or business to become employees or
independent contractors of another person or business shall not be construed as a restraint from exercising a
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2020) (prohibiting certain types
of noncompetition agreements but not nonsolicitation agreements); Gould, supra note 54, at 517–18 (“[I]t
appears that [section 653.295] applies only to noncompete agreements and does not apply at all to nonsolicitation
agreements, leaving nonsolicitation agreements free from any statutory restrictions.”); see also Michael Selmi,
Trending and the Restatement of Employment Law’s Provisions on Employee Mobility, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
1369, 1381 (2015) (noting that NSAs “had traditionally been scrutinized lightly” compared to CNCs “because
they were a lesser form of restraint”).
The case law in California is muddled regarding the enforceability of NSAs. Some older lower court
decisions indicated that California statutory law prohibiting contractual restraints on employment “does not
invalidate an employee’s agreement . . . not to solicit [the former employer’s] customers.” Loral Corp. v. Moyes,
219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (Ct. App. 1985); accord Webb v. W. Side Dist. Hosp., 193 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84–85 (Ct.
App. 1983) (upholding an arbitration decision enforcing a no-hire clause). But in 2008, the California Supreme
Court struck down a one-year NSA that prohibited the defendant from soliciting his former employer’s
customers, holding that it was “invalid because it restrained [the employee’s] ability to practice his profession.”
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 292 (Cal. 2008). More recently, several federal and state court
decisions in California have called Loral into question, holding that it is no longer good law in light of Edwards.
See, e.g., WeRide Corp. v. Huang, 379 F. Supp. 3d 834, 852 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Conversion Logic, Inc. v.
Measured, Inc., No. 219CV05546ODWFFMX, 2019 WL 6828283, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2019); Barker
v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 16-CV-07186-BLF, 2019 WL 176260, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019); AMN
Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 587–90 (Ct. App. 2018).
58. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3; see also id. at 42 (finding nearly all CEO employment agreements
studied contained an NDA).

1194

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1183

use and transfer of knowledge in a business context are potentially
anticompetitive.59 However, unlike CNCs, “a standalone NDA does not
necessarily restrict an employee’s mobility options” because “[t]he employee
can still move to a competitor.”60 NDAs are widely used and permissible, even
in states like California where CNCs are generally not enforced.61
B. THEORETICAL VIEWS REGARDING NONCOMPETES
Traditional economic theory views CNCs and other contractual postemployment restrictions on competition as important legal tools for the
development of human capital.62 Firms can increase their productivity—and
thus their profitability—by investing in training of their workforce.63 This may
involve general training of transferrable skills, specific training that is most
valuable to the current employer, or both.64 Absent a CNC, however, “an
incentive for opportunistic behavior is created” once a worker receives this
training, “either by going to work for himself or by going to work for another
firm, which will pay him a premium because of the value of his training.”65 As
a result, “employers would underinvest in research, development, and employee
training”—particularly “general training” that is readily transferrable to a new
position—without post-employment restraints like CNCs.66
Second, under the traditional view, CNCs are justifiable as an effective
method for firms to protect against the intentional or accidental disclosure of
confidential business information, including trade secrets, to their competitors.67
Even though employers can (and often do) contractually require their employees
not to disclose trade secret information after termination through an NDA, this
may prove insufficient, as a former employee may be unable to ignore the
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 20.
61. Id. at 21.
62. See generally Blake, supra note 12; Kitch, supra note 12; Rubin & Shedd, supra note 12; see also Mark
A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified
Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2002).
63. See Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 425 (“Companies can increase their productivity by training
workers, developing new products and processes, and building relationships with customers and suppliers.”);
see also Eric Garton, The Case for Investing More in People, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-case-for-investing-more-in-people.
64. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 11–18 (1964).
65. Rubin & Shedd, supra note 12, at 97; see also Blake, supra note 12, at 652 (explaining that absent
post-employment restraints on competition, an employer “cannot be sure” that an employee it has trained “will
stay on so that [its] investment will be rewarded, since contracts for personal services are not usually specifically
enforced”).
66. On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 833, 837 (2013); see also Blake, supra note 12, at 652 (“Unless some enforceable commitment or
effective deterrent is possible, employers will not be justified in making the optimum outlay on employeetraining programs . . . .”).
67. Blake, supra note 12, at 667–74; see also Moffat, supra note 1, at 900 (“It is often asserted that
noncompetes are necessary for the protection of trade secrets . . . . Noncompete agreements regularly cite trade
secrets or confidential information as the ‘protectable interest’ sought to be guarded with the contract.”).
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information learned in their previous job while working for a competitor.68
Moreover, a post hoc breach of contract claim against a former employee for
violating an NDA may be ineffective at undoing the harm caused.69
Consequently, “[t]he most effective protective device” for trade secrets and
other proprietary business information “is an enforceable covenant not to
compete.”70
More recently, however, numerous legal and economics scholars have
forcefully challenged the traditional view regarding the normative desirability
of CNCs.71 First, they contend that CNCs negatively impact the mobility of
skilled labor, which adversely affects employee productivity and economic
efficiency.72 By definition, CNCs constrain employees’ freedom to work,
temporarily precluding them from taking another position in the same field as
their former employer. This effectively sidelines highly educated and valuable
workers, wasting their time, atrophying their skills, and potentially degrading
their professional networks.73 Even if it is unclear whether the CNC would
apply, the in terrorem effect of a potential lawsuit may cause the former
employee to refrain from seeking new employment during the CNC.74 At the
same time, an employee subject to a CNC may be less attractive on the job
market, as the risk of litigation may deter a prospective new employer—
68. See Blake, supra note 12, at 669–70 (“Even in the best of good faith, a former technical or ‘creative’
employee working for a competitor . . . can hardly prevent his knowledge of his former employer’s confidential
methods or data from showing up in his work.”).
69. See id. at 669 (“[T]he important thing to the employer is not having a cause of action in case of a breach
of confidence, but preventing the violation from occurring. An injunction not to disclose can seldom undo or
effectively prevent the doing of the real damage.”).
70. Id. at 670.
71. See generally LOBEL, supra note 16; Amir & Lobel, supra note 66; Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not
to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection
for Human Capital Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006); Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly
Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376
(2009); Gilson, supra note 15; Marx, The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19; Moffat, supra
note 1; Moffat, supra note 17; Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19. But see Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13,
at 975–78 (responding to some of these arguments); Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor
Mobility in Innovation Markets 12–29 (USC Gould Sch. of L. Ctr. for L. & Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series No.
CLASS16-13, 2016), https://perma.cc/V2T9-6UGC (critiquing some of the most widely-cited empirical studies
that contend noncompetes reduce labor mobility).
72. See Blake, supra note 12, at 650 (“Anything that impedes an employee’s freedom of access to a job in
which [the employee’s] productivity . . . would be higher, involves a cost in terms of the economy’s welfare.”).
73. See Garmaise, supra note 71; Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and
Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 331 (2006) (“An inventive
employee . . . . wants to start a new company . . . . But his employer included a boilerplate non-competition
covenant in his employment contract, and he is sidelined for a year from any activity that his employer might
deem competitive. He must instead pursue a business less suited to his talents, or in which he has less experience.
Waiting for one year means a wasted period, and few, if any, employees have the means to do nothing for a year
before launching a competitive business.”); see also Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 780–81 (Tex.
2011) (Willett, J., concurring) (“Economic dynamism in the 21st century requires speed, knowledge, and
innovation—imperatives that must inform judicial review of efforts to sideline skilled talent. Courts must
critically examine noncompetes in light of our contemporary, knowledge-based economy that prizes ingenuity
and intellectual talent.”) (footnote omitted).
74. Moffat, supra note 1, at 888.
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especially if the former employer is a deep-pocketed incumbent in the same
industry.75 Thus, by limiting mobility, CNCs can “reduce the average quality of
matches between employees and employers,” adversely impacting “the
productivity of companies.”76 As a result, critics of CNCs argue they can harm
both employees and their prospective new employers.
Second, CNCs may depress employees’ wages. A noncompete “has an
inevitable tendency to reduce an employee’s . . . bargaining power during his
employment,” as the employee cannot freely switch positions,77 thus
diminishing the threat that the employee will depart for higher wages
elsewhere.78 Indeed, CNCs are often the product of a preexisting disparity in
bargaining power. “[A]s a general matter, employers have vastly more power in
the negotiation and performance of the employment relationship. This
asymmetry heavily influences the existence and character of [CNCs].”79 As Viva
Moffat has noted, CNCs “are rarely negotiated and, indeed, are often entered
into well after the employment relationship has begun,” when the employee’s
bargaining power is low.80 And as previously mentioned, the threat of CNCs
may require employees to take “occupational detours” to avoid potential
litigation, which can harm their lifetime earnings.81
Third, CNCs may impede entrepreneurship and adversely affect
innovation. By limiting labor mobility, CNCs can hinder employees from
leaving their former employers to launch a new firm. This may occur directly by
preventing a startup from competing against its founders’ previous employer(s),
as well as indirectly by making it more difficult for a startup to hire an
experienced workforce.82 In addition, CNCs interfere with the flow of
information that occurs when employees change firms.83 Scholars who favor
75. See Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-Compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?, 12
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 39, 52 (2012) (“[N]on-competes may favor large firms over small ones because of
the asymmetric costs of the legal system.”).
76. Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 428.
77. Blake, supra note 12, at 648.
78. See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 869 (2004)
(discussing the role of competing job offers in bargaining using negotiation theory).
79. Moffat, supra note 1, at 885 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 884. However, some states require additional consideration—such as a promotion or raise—to
support a noncompete entered into during employment. See, e.g., Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d
1266, 1274–75 (Pa. 2015); Charles T. Creench, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345, 351–54 (Ky. 2014). But see
Runzkeimer Int’l, Ltd. v. Friedlen, 862 N.W.2d 879, 890–92 (Wis. 2015) (holding that continued employment
is sufficient consideration to support a noncompete entered into during employment).
81. See Matt Marx, Good Work if You Can Get It . . . Again: Non-Compete Agreements, “Occupational
Detours,” and Attainment (July 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1456748 (finding, based on field data from interviews and a survey, that individuals
seek to avoid violating post-employment restraints by taking “occupational detours”).
82. Samila & Sorensen, supra note 19, at 428.
83. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 34, at 253–54; see also Bishara, supra note 71, at 306 (“[K]nowledge
transfer from departing employees to other firms is, by design, inhibited by covenant not to compete
enforcement. Knowledge spillover is thus less likely to happen in that manner because when employees are
mobile and move to other firms they take tacit information with them, but by definition noncompetes limit
mobility.” (footnote omitted)).
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limiting CNCs contend that these “information spillovers” play an important
role in stimulating innovation, particularly in high-technology industries.84
Fourth, some scholars have highlighted the negative impact of CNCs on
workers’ autonomy and dignitary interests. As Harlan Blake explained in his
seminal 1960 article on noncompetes, “[e]very postemployment restraint, for
whatever reason imposed, has inevitable effects which in some degree oppose
commonly shared values. In view of our feeling that a man should not be able to
barter away his personal freedom, even this small degree of servitude is
distasteful.”85 Although these concerns are not prominent in the economic
literature, some have argued that employees’ autonomy and freedom should be
more strongly considered in the normative debate regarding CNCs.86
C. EXISTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON NONCOMPETES
This Subpart summarizes the methodology and results from a number of
empirical studies of CNCs and other post-employment restrictive covenants. It
is not intended to provide a complete report of all empirical research in this
field,87 but instead to highlight the most relevant studies conducted to date, their
key findings, and some of their limitations.88

84. LOBEL, supra note 16, at 39–40, 95–97; Amir & Lobel, supra note 66, at 856–61; Gilson, supra note
15, at 579, 603–08.
85. Blake, supra note 12, at 650.
86. See Moffat, supra note 17, at 911 (“While the discussion of the efficiency implications is quite robust
in the literature, the personal autonomy and dignitary concerns are often treated in . . . parenthetical fashion.”).
87. Most notably, it does not include empirical studies in the economic and business literature that focus
on the impact of differential enforcement of CNCs between states on numerous issues, including
entrepreneurship, employee mobility, firm performance, capital investment, and employee training and wages.
For a more detailed summary of this scholarship, see generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 523–34.
88. For a comprehensive list of the existing empirical literature regarding CNCs through 2016, see
generally Bishara & Starr, supra note 23 (identifying twenty-four empirical studies). Empirical studies that at
least partially involve CNCs that postdate the Bishara & Starr article include: Daniel Aobdia, Employee Mobility,
Noncompete Agreements, Product-Market Competition, and Company Disclosure, 23 REV. ACCOUNTING STUD.
296 (2018); Thor Berger & Carl Benedikt Frey, Regional Technological Dynamism and Noncompete Clauses:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 57 J. REG’L SCI. 655 (2017); Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An
Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 650 (2018); David P. Twomey, The Developing Law of Employee
Non-Competition Agreements: Correcting Abuses; Making Adjustment to Enhance Economic Growth, 50 BUS.
L. REV. 87 (2017); Desheng Yin, Iftekhar Hasan, Nada Kobeissi & Haizhi Wang, Enforceability of
Noncompetition Agreements and Firm Innovation: Does State Regulation Matter?, 19 INNOVATION: MGMT.,
POL’Y & PRAC. 270 (2017); Smriti Anand, Iftekhar Hasan, Priyanka Sharma & Haizhi Wang, Enforceability of
Non-Complete Agreements: When Does State Stifle Productivity? (Bank of Fin. Rsch., Discussion Paper No.
24/2017, 2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3022475; Jessica S. Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility
on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship (Dec. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract_id=3040393; Omesh Kini, Ryan Wiliams & Sirui Yin, CEO Noncompete Agreements, Job Risk, and
Compensation, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2021); Michael Lipsitz, The Costs and Benefits of Noncompete
Agreements (2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University), https://hdl.handle.net/2144/27309; Starr et al., supra
note 2; Evan Starr, Justin Frake & Rajshree Agarwal, Mobility Constraint Externalities, 30 ORG. SCI. 961 (2019).
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1. Litigation Studies
Two early empirical studies relied on reported appellate court decisions
regarding CNCs. In 1990, Peter J. Whitmore reviewed a sample of 105 court
opinions from the years 1966–1968 and 1986–1988, representing past and thenpresent judicial enforcement of CNCs, respectively,89 and then handed coded
these cases for over thirty potential factors that may influence judicial decisionmaking.90 Descriptively, Whitmore’s study reported courts enforced CNCs
slightly over half of the time in both decades,91 but that the duration (time length)
of enforceable CNCs decreased over time.92 Specifically, Whitmore found that
nearly all (94%) of CNCs contained some form of time restriction, but the
average length of enforced CNCs was 21 months in the 1980s, compared to 27
months in the 1960s.93 In addition, Whitmore found that nearly all (94%) CNCs
contained some geographic and/or activity restraint,94 but that the number of
CNCs containing a geographic limitation decreased over time,95 while the
frequency of activity limitations had increased.96 Whitmore also found that
courts were much more likely to enforce CNCs over both time periods when the
employee had access to and/or used confidential customers lists or trade secrets
in his or her subsequent employment.97
A decade later, Helen LaVan randomly sampled 104 litigated cases in
federal and state court involving noncompete agreements litigated in the 1980s
and 1990s.98 From this group of cases, LaVan found that CNCs involved
managers 25% of the time, sales personnel 31% of the time, and other
professionals 37% of the time.99 Nearly a quarter (23.7%) of the sampled CNC
cases involved trade secrets, with 14.2% also involving confidential business

89. Whitmore, supra note 24, at 494 n.67; see also id. app. A, at 528–32 (listing sampled cases).
90. Id. at 494–95; see also id. app. B, at 533 (listing variables).
91. Id. at 499 tbl.1 (reporting an overall enforcement rate of 58% for the 1960s cases and 55% for the
1980s).
92. Id. at 500–01.
93. Id. at 501. It is unclear why Whitmore’s study reported mean (average) duration of CNCs rather than
the median; the median is typically preferred as a descriptive statistic because it is more resistant to outliers.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 509 tbl.7 (reporting that 45% of CNCs in the decisions from the 1960s contained a geographic
limitation compared to 26% of CNCs in the decisions from the 1980s). The study also found that the average
mileage restriction in CNCs decreased between the 1960s and 1980s as well. See id. at 511 tbl.9 (finding that
the average geographic restriction of CNCs was 70.6 miles in the decisions from the 1960s versus 45.0 miles in
the decisions from the 1980s).
96. See id. at 509 tbl.7 (reporting that 39% of CNCs in the 1960s contained an activity limitation compared
to 50% in the 1980s).
97. Id. at 503 tbl.2, 508 tbls.5 & 6.
98. Helen LaVan, A Logit Model to Predict the Enforceability of Noncompete Agreements, 12 EMP. RESP.
& RTS. J. 219, 225 (2000). Although not entirely clear from the article, it appears that this random sample was
drawn from a larger pool of 411 court opinions cited, discussed, or reported in Volumes 1–14 (1985 to 1998) of
the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) looseleaf publication Individual Employee Rights Manual. See id. at 219,
225, 234. Approximately 30% of these cases were in federal court (both district and appellate), and the remaining
amount (70%) were in state court. Id. at 227 tbl.II.
99. Id. at 227 tbl.II. Another 1% were classified as CNCs involving entertainers. Id.
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information.100 This study also reported that in slightly over half of the cases
(54.5%), courts found the CNC’s geographic limitation to be reasonable,
although it did not specify what these limitations were.101 Similarly, LaVan
reported that courts found activity restrictions in nearly two-thirds of the
sampled CNCs (63.7%) to be reasonable, but the article did not describe the
scope of these restrictions.102
2. Studies of Specific Types of Employees
A number of empirical studies have examined CNCs covering specific
types of employees. Several of these have looked at employment agreements of
high-ranking corporate executives of publicly-traded companies, whose
contracts are publicly available in SEC filings.103 In a 2006 article, Stewart
Schwab and Randall Thomas examined a sample of 375 employment contracts
for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) at the 1500 largest public corporations,
including whether these contracts included CNCs.104 They found that about twothirds (67.5%) of sampled CEO employment contracts contained CNCs, most of
which were either for one (21.33%) or two (31.47%) years in length.105
In another study, Mark Garmaise looked at a random sample of SEC filings
for 500 large, publicly traded firms from between 1992 and 2004, finding
evidence that over 70% of these firms had CNCs with their top executives.106
Somewhat surprisingly, this study also found that a majority (58%) of California
firms in the sample reported using CNCs,107 even though these agreements are
usually unenforceable under California law.108 Garmaise also developed a 12factor scale to assess the strength of state enforcement of noncompetes (the
“non-competition enforcement index”).109 Based on this scale, Garmaise found
that increased state enforcement of CNCs “reduces executive mobility” and
“results in lower executive compensation.”110
In perhaps the most detailed study of actual employment agreements
containing post-employment restraints to date, Norman Bishara, Kenneth
Martin, and Randall Thomas analyzed CEO employment contracts for a random
sample 500 S&P 1500 companies between 1996 and 2010.111 They then hand
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3 (“[P]ublic companies must disclose their CEOs’ employment
contracts.”).
104. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What
Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 232–34 (2006).
105. Id. at 254–55, 255 tbl.9.
106. Garmaise, supra note 71, at 388, 396.
107. Id. at 396.
108. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
109. Garmaise, supra note 71, app. A.6. Barnett and Sichelman have critiqued Garmaise’s non-competition
enforcement index as problematic for several reasons. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 1010–17.
110. Garmaise, supra note 71, at 376–79.
111. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 3.
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coded each CEO employment agreement (874 in total) for a wide variety of
information, including the frequency, scope, and duration of CNCs, NSAs, and
NDAs in these contracts.112 Bishara et al. report that over 70% of CEO contracts
in their sample contained post-employment CNCs,113 but that CNCs were less
frequently used if the firm’s primary location was in California.114 Examining
CNCs in more detail, they found that a majority of CEOs’ CNCs lasted two years
or less after their employment ended,115 and that the geographic scope of these
CNCs was quite broad—they most commonly applied either anywhere the
employer operated or did business (38.3%) or had no express geographic limit
(41.8%).116 In addition, three-quarters (75.6%) of these agreements contained
NSAs prohibiting CEOs from soliciting employees of their former firm, and a
slight majority (50.8%) prohibited CEOs from soliciting customers of their
former firm.117 Finally, the vast majority of CEO contracts (87.1%) contained
an NDA, and nearly all contracts that had a CNC also had an NDA (93.4%).118
Two other studies dealt with surveys of other groups of high-skill groups
of workers. In conjunction with the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (IEEE), Matt Marx surveyed over 1000 engineers across a variety of
industries.119 Almost half of respondents (46.8%) indicated that they had been
asked by an employer to sign a CNC; of these, nearly all (92.6%) agreed to do
so.120 In addition, Marx reported that over three-quarters (77.14%) of engineers
who signed a CNC did so on or before their first day of employment with the
firm.121
In a recent paper, Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, and William D. White
surveyed nearly 2000 primary care physicians in five states.122 They found that
nearly half (45%) of primary care physicians in group practices are bound by
CNCs.123 The percentage of physicians covered by state varied significantly,

112. See id. at 24–27 (describing the study’s methodology).
113. Id. at 29 tbl.3.
114. See id. at 34 tbl.6 (finding that CNCs were found in 84% of CEO contracts where the firm’s primary
location was outside of California, compared to 62.4% where the firm’s primary location was inside California,
and that this difference is statistically significant).
115. See id. at 36–37, 36 tbl.7 (reporting that 32.8% of CEOs had a CNC of one year or less, and another
31.8% had a CNC greater than one year but no more than two years; 7% were for greater than two years; and
the remaining 28.5% did not specify a length or had another triggering event for the CNC’s termination).
116. See id. at 41 tbl.9 (reporting also that another 5.3% of CNCs expressly applied worldwide, while 10.2%
covered only the entire United States and another 4.3% covered only part of the United States).
117. Id. at 38.
118. Id. at 42.
119. Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical
Professionals, 76 AM. SOCIO. REV. 695, 701–02 (2011). The survey was sent to 5000 randomly-selected IEEE
members, with a response rate of 20.6% (1029 surveys). Id. at 702.
120. Id. at 702 tbl.1.
121. Id. at 706 tbl.4.
122. Lavetti et al., supra note 24. The survey in question is the Physician Perspectives on Patient Care
Survey, which the authors conducted in 2007. Id. at 1040. The states where primary care physicians were
surveyed are: California, Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Id.
123. Id. at 1030.
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from a low of 31.3% in California to a high of 60.6% in Pennsylvania.124 The
former figure is interesting in light of the fact that CNCs are generally
unenforceable in California.125 In addition, primary care physicians who worked
at group practices of more than a handful of doctors were more likely to be
covered by CNCs.126 Group practices that used CNCs were more likely to
generate greater revenue per physician and spend more hours on patient care per
week.127 Finally, Lavetti et al. found that physicians covered by CNCs had
longer tenures with a practice group, and thus were less likely to change
positions, compared to those without CNCs.128
3. Online Surveys
A recent large-scale online survey of American workers provides
additional information regarding the frequency and scope of CNCs and other
post-employment restraints on competition. In a forthcoming article, Evan Starr,
J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara report the results of a survey of labor force
participants age 18 to 75 who reported working in the private sector (for profit
or non-profit organizations) or were an employee of a public healthcare
system.129 After inviting over 700,000 participants, the authors conducted an
extensive audit of completed survey responses to filter out potentially
duplicative and unreliable surveys, resulting in a final sample of 11,505
respondents.130 From these responses, they found an estimated 18% of workers
were bound by a CNC.131 Consistent with expectations, CNCs were more
frequent among well-educated workers132 and highly-compensated
employees,133 but approximately a third (35%) of respondents who lacked an
undergraduate (bachelor’s) degree reported being covered by a CNC at some
point in the past, as well as a third (33%) of workers who made under $40,000
per year.134 Similarly, CNCs were more common in certain highly-skilled
124. Id. at 1042 tbl.1.
125. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
126. Specifically, practices with 2–3 physicians used CNCs less than a third of the time (31.3%), while
practices of 4–499 physicians used CNCs between 45–50% of the time. Lavetti et al., supra note 24, at 1056
tbl.8.
127. See id. at 1057 tbl.9.
128. Id. at 1058–61.
129. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 3.
130. Id. at 3–4; see also Prescott et al., supra note 23, at 406–55 (describing authors’ methodology in detail).
131. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 5. Another recent survey of employers concluded that between 27.8% and
46.5% of private sector workers are subject to a noncompete. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Heidi Shierholz,
Noncompete Agreements: Ubiquitous, Harmful to Wages and to Competition, and Part of a Growing Trend of
Employers Requiring Workers to Sign Away Their Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements.
132. See Starr et al., supra note 2, at 6, 22 fig.3 (reporting that 25% of surveyed persons with a bachelor’s
degree and 39% of persons with a professional degree were currently subject to a CNC, compared to under 15%
for high school graduates and persons with less than two years of college).
133. Id. at 6, 22 fig.4 (reporting that at least 32% of surveyed persons making in excess of $100,000 per
year were currently subject to a CNC, compared to 15% or less for those making less than $40,000).
134. Id. at 6.
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occupations such as engineering, computer science, and management.135 Persons
who worked with trade secret information were significantly more likely to be
bound by a CNCs.136 In another paper based upon the same survey data, the
authors find that CNCs are also associated with decreased labor mobility.137
In a recent policy paper, Alan Krueger and Eric Posner reported the results
of an online survey of 795 employees.138 Based on a weighted sample, they
found that 15.5% of workers were currently covered by a CNC. They also found
that higher-income workers were more likely to be subject to a CNC.139 But in
contrast to Starr et al., Krueger and Posner found that the percentage of workers
bound by a CNC was slightly higher for those with a high school degree or less
than for workers with at least some college education.140
4. Experimental Studies
A number of experimental studies have also attempted to assess the impact
of CNCs on employee mobility and performance. Some of these studies involve
interactions with voluntary participants in a controlled environment, while
another cluster of articles has studied the impact of a single state’s apparently
accidental change regarding the enforceability of CNCs.
In one frequently-cited study, Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee
Fleming exploited a “natural experiment”141 involving Michigan’s Antitrust
Reform Act, which the authors asserted inadvertently repealed the state’s
statutory bar on enforcing noncompete agreements.142 Using a difference-in135. Id. at 7, 23 fig.5.
136. Id. at 7, 25 fig.7.
137. See Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, The Behavioral Effects of (Unenforceable) Contracts,
J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34–35), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2858637.
138. ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR PROTECTING LOWINCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 7–8 (2018), https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/
files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_collusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf.
139. Id. at 8.
140. See id. (reporting that 17.5% of workers with a high school education or less were bound by CNCs,
compared to 14.6% for those who had at least some college education).
141. A natural experiment in economics is a “serendipitous situation in which persons are assigned randomly
to a treatment (or multiple treatments) and a control group, and outcomes are analysed for the purposes” of
testing a hypothesis. J. DiNardo, Natural Experiments and Quasi-Natural Experiments, in 5 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 9235, 9325–26 (3d ed. 2018). See generally THAD DUNNING, NATURAL
EXPERIMENTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: A DESIGN-BASED APPROACH (2012) (providing an overview of the
topic).
142. See Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19, at 877 (citing Act 274,
Michigan Antitrust Reform Act of 1984 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.771–445.788 (2021))). The
Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) was based on the Uniform State Antitrust Act promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws. See 2 ROCKY C. TSAI & KATHLEEN W. BRADISH,
STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE & STATUTES (5th ed. 2014). However, in enacting MARA, the Michigan legislature
repealed MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.761 (enacted in 1905), which provided that “[a]ll agreements and contracts
by which any person . . . agrees not to engage in any avocation or employment . . . are hereby declared to be
against public policy and illegal and void.” Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19,
at 877 (omissions in original). Based on the lack of contemporaneous commentary in the legislative history and
law journal articles shortly after MARA’s passage, Marx et al. conclude that MARA “inadvertently repealed”
this statutory ban on enforcing CNCs. Id.
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differences approach, they compared the job mobility of patented inventors in
Michigan before and after this change with inventors in ten other states that did
not enforce CNCs.143 Marx et al. found that the intra-state job mobility of
inventors in Michigan fell 8.1% once CNCs became enforceable,144 with highlyskilled inventors in Michigan suffering an even greater decline of 16.2%.145 In a
follow-up study, Marx, Fleming, and Jasjit Singh found that the rate of interstate
emigration of patented inventors in Michigan grew faster compared to other nonenforcing states in the decade following Michigan’s legislative change,146
leading the authors to conclude that CNCs “encourage the migration of [highly
skilled] workers from states where such contracts are enforceable to states where
they are not.”147
However, Jonathan Barnett and Ted Sichelman have critiqued numerous
aspects of the Marx et al. studies, including the incompleteness of the patent
record for tracking inventor mobility, the selection of other (control) states as
non-enforcing jurisdictions for CNCs, and the failure to control for the inclusion
of a “savings clause” in Michigan’s antitrust legislation which provided that preexisting CNCs remained enforceable after its enactment.148 Further muddying
the waters is a recent paper that employed a similar difference-in-differences
methodology involving Michigan and found that enforcement of CNCs “had a
positive and significant effect on the startup job creation rate” and “little to no
effect on the entry rate of new firms.”149
Experimental studies also have reached mixed results regarding the impact
of CNCs on employees’ motivation and work performance. In a 2013 study, On
Amir and Orly Lobel assessed the effects of postemployment restrictions on task
performance by conducting an online experiment involving over 1000
subjects.150 Participants were randomly assigned different types of work

143. Marx et al., The Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, supra note 19, at 879–82. In particular, Marx et
al. used matching algorithms for inventors in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent file,
which contained data on all U.S. patents issued from 1975 to 2000, supplemented by additional data collected
by the authors. Id. at 879 (citing Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER Patent
Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 8498, 2001)).
144. Id. at 884–86. This figure excluded Michigan inventors who worked for automobile firms. Id. at 887.
145. Marx et al. defined highly-skilled inventors as those that were one standard deviation above the mean
in terms of patenting. Id. at 886.
146. See Marx et al., Regional Disadvantage?, supra note 19, at 397, 399 tbl.2 (finding that the rate of
emigration of patented inventors in Michigan grew from 0.24% in 1975–1984 to 0.32% from 1985–1996,
compared to patented inventors in the control group of states that did not enforce noncompetes, which decreased
from 0.20% to 0.13% during these time periods).
147. Id. at 403.
148. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 1017–18, 1020–23; Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 71,
at 73–83.
149. See Gerald Carlino, Do Non-Compete Covenants Influence State Startup Activity? Evidence from the
Michigan Experiment (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-30, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3041843.
150. Amir & Lobel, supra note 66, at 837. These subjects were intended to simulate a high-skilled
marketplace—99% had an undergraduate degree, while 43% also had a graduate degree. Id. at 852.
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assignments requiring either pure effort or more creative production.151 In
addition, each participant was randomly assigned one of three conditions: an
absolute noncompete that would preclude the subject from completing the same
kind of task in future assignments; a partial noncompete where an employee
could opt out of the restriction against similar work by paying back the training
costs to the employer; and no contractual restriction.152 The results from this
experiment found that subjects with a CNC had a higher rate of failing to
complete the assigned work.153 In addition, participants with a CNC were twice
as likely to make mistakes in the effort-based task.154 Based on these results,
Amir and Lobel contend that “certain postemployment contractual restrictions
may negatively impact motivation and performance” and “discourage
employees to invest in their work performance.”155
In a 2016 article, Guido Buenstorf, Christoph Engel, Sven Fisher, and
Werner Gueth reported the results of an experiment intended to simulate a
principal-agent relationship subject to different noncompete restrictions.156 Two
of the conditions involved a CNC, while a third (baseline) condition lacked any
restraint.157 The study participants were 256 university students.158 Contrary to
the authors’ hypotheses, the results of the experiment showed that “imposing a
non-compete clause has no significant effect on effort.”159 From this, Buenstorf
et al. concluded that “our experimental results do not suggest that adverse
effects” on employee motivation from CNCs “are a substantial concern” in most
cases.160
5. Key Findings and Limitations of Prior Studies
Several inferences may be drawn regarding the frequency, scope, and
potential impact of CNCs from the existing body of empirical research. First, it
appears that CNCs are widely used by employers, particularly for highly-skilled,
highly-compensated employees. However, there is also evidence suggesting that
a substantial number of lower-wage workers are subject to CNCs as well.
Second, it appears that workers who deal with trade secret and other confidential
business information are more likely to be covered by a CNC. Third, it appears

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 854 (finding a 24% increase in dropout rates of participants subject to a noncompete).
154. Id. at 855. In contrast, subjects had a similar performance level in terms of error rates for the more
creative assignment. Id.
155. Id. at 863; see also id. at 866 (“The results of this experimental study suggest that, under certain
conditions, postemployment restrictions will suppress motivation to perform as well as degrade performance
itself.”).
156. Guido Buenstorf, Christoph Engel, Sven Fischer & Werner Gueth, Non-Compete Clauses, Employee
Effort and Spin-Off Entrepreneurship: A Laboratory Experiment, 45 RSCH. POL’Y 2113, 2114 (2016).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2117.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2121.
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that many CNCs are limited in duration, often for two years or less. Fourth, some
CNCs are also expressly limited by geographic scope and/or activity restrictions,
but it is not clear how often or to what extent these limitations occur. Fifth, even
though CNCs are less common among workers and firms in California—not
surprising in light of that state’s general non-enforcement policy regarding
CNCs—they are not entirely absent. Finally, using a variety of methodologies,
a number of the studies conclude that CNCs significantly inhibit employee
mobility.
While valuable, these empirical studies all have limitations that suggest a
degree of caution is warranted in assessing their findings and their potential
value for policymakers.161 First, many of these studies examine only a specific
type of employer—such as large, publicly-traded firms—or a specific type of
employee—usually highly educated and highly compensated workers, like
CEOs and doctors—that limits the ability to extrapolate their findings to the
more diverse American business and labor markets.162
Second, only a handful of these studies involve the review of actual
employment contracts (or other legally-binding documents, such as retention or
bonus agreements) that may contain CNCs and other post-employment
restrictions.163 This is not surprising because employment contracts are
generally not publicly available,164 so most researchers have used other data
sources, such as survey information, instead. But these alternative sources
(which are essentially proxies) also have limits. For example, in the Starr et al.
survey, nearly 30% of all respondents were unable to give a “yes” or “no” answer
to the basic, threshold question of whether they had ever agreed to a CNC, with
most of these (24.8%) indicating that they had never heard of CNCs.165 As a
result, the accuracy of self-reported information to the more detailed questions
in this survey may also be in question. In addition, even though online surveys
are now widely used in numerous academic disciplines due to their speed and
relatively low cost, they may have their own biases and limitations compared to
more traditional survey methods like telephone surveys or in-person interviews,
including the representativeness of the responding population.166
161. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 13, at 964 (contending that “these [empirical] studies suffer from
significant methodological limitations, deliver statistically weak results, and do not provide compelling support
for the view that banning noncompetes promotes innovation”).
162. See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 71, at 5 (“Some studies focus on specific types of personnel, such
as top executives, or types of firms, such as very large companies, that limit their applicability.”).
163. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 24 (“Since employment contracts are not generally publicly
available, researchers have been unable to examine [them] empirically.”).
164. See id. at 3 (“[M]ost employment contracts are not publicly available, leaving researchers to speculate
on the prevalence of these restrictions and their contents.”).
165. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 5.
166. See Corina Cornesse & Michael Bosnjak, Is There an Association Between Survey Characteristics and
Representativeness? A Meta-Analysis, 12 SURVEY RSCH. METHODS 1, 9 (2018) (finding web-based surveys to
be less representative than other single-mode survey methods); see also Dan Kahan, What’s a “Valid” Sample?
Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 1, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 8, 2013, 9:34
AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/8/whats-a-valid-sample-problems-with-mechanical-turk-
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Third, empirical studies of CNCs based on court decisions are subject to
the well-known selection effect. “[T]he selection effect refers to the proposition
that the selection of tried cases is not a random sample of the mass of underlying
cases” because “[c]ases only go to trial when the parties substantially disagree
on the predicted outcome.”167 Thus, “the disputes selected for litigation . . . will
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample.”168
Fourth, the underlying sources of information in several of the studies—
particularly those relying on litigated cases—are now dated and thus may not be
representative of current law and practice regarding CNCs. In particular, the
Whitmore study relies in part on court opinions that are now fifty years old,169
and the LaVan study uses cases dating back over thirty years as well.170 But even
some of the more recent studies that use survey evidence may be less-thantimely. For instance, Lavetti et al. rely on a 2007 survey of primary care
physicians,171 but much has changed in both the practice and business of
medicine since then, most notably the enactment, implementation, and attempts
to repeal the Affordable Care Act.172
Fifth, nearly all of these existing empirical studies focus primarily or
exclusively on CNCs, ignoring other potential contractual limits on postemployment competition, such as NSAs that preclude the recruitment of an
employer’s clients or employees and NDAs that prohibit the disclosure of trade
secret and other confidential information after termination of employment.173 As
a result, these studies only paint at best a partial picture regarding employers’
use of contract law to limit post-employment competition from their former
employees.
study-sam.html (criticizing the validity of surveys using Amazon Mechanical Turk for “the study of how cultural
or ideological commitments” influence cognitive processes); Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who?
Problems with Mechanical Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July 10, 2013, 9:30
AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/10/fooled-twice-shame-on-who-problems-withmechanical-turk-stud.html (elaborating further on the alleged invalidity of Mechanical Turk samples “for the
study of culturally or ideologically” motivated reasoning due to selection bias, prior repeated exposure to study
measures, and possible misrepresentation of nationality). But see Scott Clifford, Ryan M. Jewell & Philip D.
Waggoner, Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?, RSCH. & POL.,
Dec. 2015, at 1, 7 (“Our study . . . provides evidence for the validity of samples drawn from [Mechanical Turk]
for psychological research on ideology.”).
167. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1129 (1992) (quoting Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337 (1990)). The seminal article on the
“selection effect” is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 1 (1984).
168. Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 4.
169. See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 24, 122–128 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Neda Laiteerapong & Elbert S. Huang, The Pace of Change in Medical Practice and
Health Policy: Collision or Coexistence?, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 848 (2015) (describing the impact of the
Affordable Care Act of 2010 on primary care physicians and their practices).
173. Bishara et al. is a notable counterexample; this study contains substantial data on both NSAs and NDAs.
See Bishara et al., supra note 1.
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In sum, despite the valuable and important work done by legal, business,
and economics scholars so far, there is room for additional empirical research
on CNCs and other post-employment restraints on competition, especially those
that use actual employment agreements from a broad cross-section of the
American workforce as data sources.

II. METHODOLOGY
This Part first details the research objectives of this empirical project. It
then explains the study design and data collection process. Finally, it describes
some potential limitations of the methodology described herein.
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Rather than starting with the articulation of formal hypotheses, this project
began by recognizing that the existing empirical literature on CNCs lacked a
large-scale study of actual employment contracts that covered more than just a
single, narrow class of employees (like CEOs).174 Relatedly, there has been
relatively little recent empirical scholarship on what types of firms and workers
use CNCs, as well as their scope.175 Further, the literature is overwhelmingly
focused on one type of post-employment restraint—CNCs—and has largely
ignored other contractual limits on competition that employers may use, such as
NSAs and NDAs.176
One as-yet-untapped source of employment contracts that could help shed
light on these questions is federal trade secret litigation. Trade secret litigation
was likely to be a fertile source of CNCs because employers may assert both
CNCs and trade secrecy claims to protect their important business
information.177 Indeed, in a previous study of trade secret litigation in federal
court under the recently-enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA), the Author
helped code whether complaints in these cases included or referred to a
noncompete agreement.178

174. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 534 (“The literature review makes clear that studies with the
actual use of noncompetes are limited . . . .”); see also LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION
TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 28 (2014) (noting that one “characteristic of a good research question is that it
seeks to engage the existing literature,” including “spott[ing] a gap” in existing studies).
175. See Bishara & Starr, supra note 23, at 535–36 (“[A]t the most basic level . . . what is missing from the
literature is an understanding of what types of firms use noncompetes, what types of workers sign noncompetes,
what the conditions of the noncompete are, and why and when such noncompetes are used.”).
176. See id. at 536 (“[F]or states considering whether they should make the use of noncompetes illegal, it is
important to know if firms . . . simply substitute other protection methods . . . .”).
177. See, e.g., Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine
Covenant Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 997–98 (2012) (noting a CNC claim may “be used in
conjunction with other theories of knowledge ownership” such as “related trade secret . . . litigation against a
former employee-owner”).
178. David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 133, 153 & n.290 (2018).
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In addition, after a preliminary review of the literature and data, one
hypothesis that emerged was the “so-called ‘California effect.’”179 Specifically,
scholars have assumed CNCs would be much less common in employment
contracts for employees and firms located in California because CNCs are
generally not enforceable there.180 Prior empirical studies have found California
residents are less likely to be covered by a CNC, but a substantial number of
Californians nonetheless report having signed one.181
B. STUDY DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION
An original dataset was created for this study.182 The starting point for data
collection was the Author’s prior dataset of federal district court cases that
involved a trade secret misappropriation claim in the one-year period following
the DTSA’s enactment in May 2016 (“DTSA Dataset”).183 As part of that
study,184 each case in the DTSA Dataset was hand coded for a variety of basic
case information,185 including the identity of the litigating parties,186 the date
when the first pleading asserting a DTSA claim was filed,187 the district court
where the case was filed,188 the case’s docket number,189 and the assigned
judge.190 To supplement this previously-collected data, the Author also searched
the Lex Machina database for DTSA cases filed on or before May 11, 2017 (the
one-year anniversary of the DTSA’s enactment).191 A total of 689 DTSA cases
were identified through these methods.

179. Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 15.
180. See id. at 48 (noting that employment contracts for firms located in California “are much less likely to
include noncompete clauses, as California state courts will not enforce the provisions”).
181. See supra notes 107, 124 and accompanying text.
182. In accordance with scholarly norms regarding empirical legal research, this dataset is being made
publicly available upon the Article’s publication. See Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur &
Arti K. Rai, Open Letter on Ethical Norms in Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339,
348 (2016) (recommending that “data needed to replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be
made accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published”). It will be available at the following
website: http://christopherbseaman.com.
183. Levine & Seaman, supra note 178, at 124–25. We used a variety of sources to identify these cases,
including full-text searches of court dockets in Bloomberg Law and searches of district court opinions in
WestlawNext and Lexis Advance. Id. The full list of DTSA cases identified from these sources is available at
http://www.dtsalitigation.com.
184. For more detail regarding coding of the DTSA Dataset, see id. at 125–33.
185. Variable names are listed in brackets in the following footnotes.
186. These were coded as two separate string (text) variables: [plaintiff] and [defendant]. If multiple
plaintiffs or defendants were named, only the first named party was used for each variable. Levine & Seaman,
supra note 178, at 125 nn.104–05.
187. This variable [date] was coded in the following format: MM/DD/YYYY. Id. at 125 n.106.
188. This variable [court] was coded using a three- or four-letter abbreviation consistent with the federal
Public Access to Court Electronic Records system (“PACER”). Id. at 126 n.107.
189. This variable [docket] was coded in the following format: N:NN-CV-NNNNN (N is a number). Id. at
126 n.108.
190. This was coded as a string variable: [judge]. Id. at 126 n.109.
191. LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
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In the initial phase of coding for this project, the pleadings in each DTSA
case were reviewed to determine if they mentioned or referred to a CNC or NSA
that applied to a current or former employee. The number of employees in each
case who were allegedly covered by these post-employment restraints was also
identified.192 In total, 335 out of 689 cases (49%) included a reference to a CNC
or NSA, covering a total of 532 employees.
Next, the online court docket was reviewed for these cases to locate the
employment agreement or other document (such as a retention or bonus
agreement) that contained the post-employment restraint(s).193 For most
employees, the full employment agreement containing the CNC and/or NSA was
available in the online court docket, often as an exhibit or attachment to the
complaint itself.194 For employees where the agreement could not be located,
information alleged in the complaint (or other relevant pleading) was used
instead.195
Each agreement was then hand coded for a variety of information.196 First,
it was coded for whether it contained a CNC, which was defined as a prohibition
on working for or being employed by a competing firm, or otherwise engaging
in competition against the former employer, after termination of employment.197
The length (duration) of the CNC198 and the geographic limit of the CNC, if any,
was also coded.199
Second, each agreement was coded for whether it included an NSA, which
was defined as a prohibition on soliciting the former employer’s customers
and/or employees.200 Many employment agreements with a CNC also contained
an NSA, even though the language of the CNC in many cases would also
preclude conduct prohibited by the NSA.201 Each agreement was also coded
more granularly for whether the NSA prohibited soliciting customers or clients
of the former employer,202 whether the NSA prohibiting soliciting other

192. This was coded as a numeric variable: [empno]. In the final dataset, a separate entry was created for
each employee subject to a noncompete.
193. We used Bloomberg Law’s dockets feature to conduct this review. “We” in this context refers to the
Author and his research assistants.
194. For 446 out of 532 employees (84%), the entire agreement was available. A hyperlink to each of these
documents is contained in the following variable in the dataset: [noncomplete_link]. The agreement was only
partially available for another 17 employees (3%), usually due to redaction of parts of the agreement.
195. This occurred for 69 out of the 532 employees (13%).
196. For more detail regarding the hand coding process, see infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
197. This was coded as a binary (dummy) variable: [cnc].
198. This was coded as a numeric variable for the CNC’s duration in months after termination of
employment: [cnc_time]. For example, a one-year CNC would be coded as 12.
199. This was coded as a categorical variable: [cnc_distance].
200. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa].
201. Specifically, of the 351 employees subject to a CNC, 301 (86%) were also subject to an NSA.
202. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa_customers].
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employees of the former employer (for example, a non-raiding clause),203 or
both.204 Finally, the length (duration) of each NSA was coded.205
Third, some additional information from the employment agreement was
coded. This included the year that the agreement was entered into;206 the
governing law specified in the agreement, if any;207 and whether the agreement
contained an arbitration clause.208 The industry of the employer was also
coded.209
Finally, information about the employee(s) covered by the CNC and/or
NSA was coded. In particular, both the complaint and the employment
agreement was reviewed to determine the employee’s job title,210 as well as the
employee’s base salary211 and eligibility for other compensation such as sales
commissions, bonuses, and equity/stock incentive agreements,212 if available.
C. LIMITATIONS
Like virtually all empirical research, the methodology used in this study
has limitations that could affect the results and implications discussed in the

203. This was coded as a binary variable: [nsa_employees].
204. This was coded as a categorical variable, based upon information from the previous two variables:
[nsa_detail].
205. This was coded as two separate variables for the NSA’s duration in months after employment:
[nsa_time_customers] for NSAs involving customers and [nsa_time_employees] for NSAs involving
employees].
206. This was coded as a four-digit number: [doc_year]. If multiple employment agreements for a single
employee contained a CNC and/or NSA, the most recent available agreement was used.
207. This was coded as a two-letter variable based on the U.S. Postal Service code for the relevant state:
[law]. For example, “CA” was used if the agreement specified that California law would apply to any dispute.
“XX” was used if no governing law was identified in the agreement or if information regarding the governing
law was not available. “OT” was used if the agreement specified that foreign (non-U.S.) law applied.
208. This was coded as a binary variable: [arbitrate]. An employer may seek to enforce a CNC in arbitration
if the employment agreement authorizes it to do so. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract:
Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
379, 381 (2006) (noting that arbitration agreements for CNCs are “increasingly common, frequently litigated,
and controversial”); see also Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21–22 (2012) (per curiam)
(overturning a state court decision that declined to submit a noncompete dispute to arbitration despite the
existence of an arbitration clause in the employment agreement).
209. This was coded as a numeric variable based upon the employer’s North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) code: [industry]. The NAICS is the standard used by federal statistical agencies
in classifying business establishments for the purposes of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data
regarding the U.S. economy. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, NORTH AMERICAN
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
(2017),
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/2017NAICS/
2017_NAICS_Manual.pdf.
210. This was coded as a categorical variable: [job]. The following categories were used: President or Chief
Executive Officer; Other Senior Management (for example, Vice President); Technical/Engineering Staff;
Sales/Customer Service Staff; Owner/Former Owner; Other; Unknown. In addition, the job title of the employee
(if available) was coded as a string variable: [job_title].
211. This was coded as numeric variable: [salary]. For employees paid at an hourly rate, the annual salary
was calculated by multiplying their hourly rate by forty hours per week, by fifty weeks per year.
212. This was coded as a binary variable: [othercomp].
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remainder of this Article.213 This Subpart discusses several potential limitations
and the Author’s efforts to address them.
First, this study is based upon information from litigation, which is subject
to the well-known selection effect. As previously mentioned, the cases that end
up in litigation “constitute neither a random nor a representative sample . . . of
all disputes.”214 One reason for this bias is that litigation is expensive; “[m]any
disputes are resolved before a lawsuit is filed” because it is often more cost
effective “to settle than to litigate.”215 In particular, this dataset is based on trade
secret litigation, which can be quite expensive, even compared to other types of
civil litigation in federal court.216 As a result, parties may select other methods,
such as alternative dispute resolution, to resolve their grievances.217
Furthermore, if the employment agreement provides for resolution of disputes
through mandatory arbitration, these cases also typically will not be litigated and
thus will not appear in the dataset.218
Second, the number of employment agreements in the dataset is relatively
small given the estimated frequency of CNCs in the American workforce. In
other words, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding millions

213. See Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision
Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 849 (“Data, research design, and statistical methods
frequently enforce limits on what can be properly inferred from the results of empirical
studies. . . . Notwithstanding these inherent and structural limitations, empirical methodologies are wellpositioned to enhance and complement traditional legal scholarship.”). Under best practices, authors of empirical
legal research “should discuss limitations on the validity and generalizability of [their] empirical findings.”
Gregory Mitchell, Essay, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 203 (2004).
214. Priest & Klein, supra note 167, at 4. It is worth noting that the Priest-Klein model is focused on
empirical studies of outcomes (such as win rates) in litigation; as such, it defines the term “litigated” narrowly
as only disputes where “a verdict is rendered.” Id. at 4–6. This study, in contrast, starts with a larger group of
DTSA cases involving a CNC or NSA and is not limited only to cases that reached a resolution on the merits.
215. Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, 1993 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 75, 79; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in
Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1571 (1989) (“Both sides can save the costs of litigation by
settling [a] dispute.”).
216. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2019 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 68 (2019) (finding in a
survey of IP attorneys that the median litigation cost for a trade secret case varied from $550,000 (if less than $1
million was at risk) to over $7.5 million (if more than $25 million was at risk)).
217. See generally Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1995) (examining reasons why parties would choose alternative dispute resolution as opposed to trial);
Scott H. Blackman & Rebecca M. McNeill, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Commercial Intellectual Property
Disputes, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1709, 1728 (1998) (explaining that ADR is often preferred in trade secret litigation
because “[b]y the very nature of the issues involved, usually at least one party . . . is very concerned about
maintaining the secrecy of the trade secret or other confidential or proprietary information”).
218. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Even if an arbitration clause is included, however, some
of these disputes may still end up in federal court for preliminary relief, such as a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Oldham Graphic Supply, Inc. v. Cornwell, No. 09-1250-WEB-KMH, 2009 WL
3003850 (D. Kan. Sept. 17, 2009) (preliminarily enjoining former employee from engaging in business activities
in violation of noncompete agreement pending the completion of arbitration proceedings); St. Jude Med. S.C.,
Inc. v. Hasty, No. CIV 06-4547, 2007 WL 128856 (D. Minn. Jan. 12, 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction
against a former employee from violating noncompete and non-solicitation provisions and referring the matter
to arbitration).
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of CNCs (and other post-employment restraints) across a wide variety of firms
and workers based upon a study of slightly over 500 employment agreements.
Third, many variables in the dataset were hand coded, which is a potential
source of error. For example, if the variables are ambiguous or include room for
subjectivity, this could result in inconsistent application and may negatively
impact reproducibility.219 However, this concern can be mitigated by creating,
pilot testing, and implementing written coding instructions that all coders220
must follow, as was done in this project.221 In addition, the Author personally
reviewed all of the coding decisions to ensure accuracy.
Fourth, information for some of the variables was missing, either because
the employment agreement was not available (and the complaint did not include
sufficient information to code), or because certain information was not included
in or redacted from the agreement. This was a particular issue, for example, for
salary information, which was only available for 89 of the 532 employees (17%).
This issue was addressed by indicating missing values in the dataset and
reporting on this situation in the results below.

III. RESULTS
This Part summarizes the results from the collected data, primarily through
descriptive statistics. It first provides a variety of information regarding the
employees in the dataset who were subject to either a CNC, an NSA, or both,
and their employers. It next summarizes data regarding CNCs in the employment
agreements. Finally, it describes some information about NSAs in these
agreements.
A. EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS
As previously described, the position (job type) and industry for each
employee covered by a CNC and/or NSA was coded. Figure 1 below shows job
types for these employees.

219. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 174, at 95–105 (describing best practices for coding).
220. The coders for this project were law students who were employed as the Author’s research assistants.
221. In empirical research, written coding instructions are preferred so that all coders apply the same criteria
for each coding decision. This promotes consistency in coding and also serves as “a check against looking,
consciously or not, for confirmation of predetermined positions.” Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 81 (2008); see also EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note
174, at 106–12 (“[T]he primary goal of a codebook is to minimize human judgment—to leave as little as possible
to interpretation.”). The written coding instructions for this project will be made available at:
http://christopherbseaman.com.
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FIGURE 1. EMPLOYEE JOB TYPES

4% (19 employees) were the President or CEO, with another 21% (100
employees) as other senior management, such as a Vice President or Regional
Manager. 12% (66 employees) worked in technical or engineering positions,
while the largest group was sales and customer service staff at 38% (200
employees). 6% (29 employees) were current or former owners of a business,222
while the remaining 20% (108 employees) had other job descriptions223 or their
jobs were unknown.
Figure 2 below shows the industry in which the employees worked, based
on the employer named in the relevant agreement.

222. These cases often involved CNCs and/or NSAs signed as a part of the sale of the owner’s business to
the new employer.
223. For example, independent contractors who were subject to a CNC and/or NSA were classified in this
category.
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FIGURE 2. INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYER
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The most common industries represented in the dataset are: finance and
insurance, 20% (105 employees); manufacturing, 17% (87 employees);
professional, scientific, and technical services, 16% (83 employees); and
wholesale and retail trade, 15% (79 employees). The next most common
industries are: administrative and support services, 8% (40 employees);
information services, 8% (40 employees); health care and social assistance, 4%
(21 employees); construction, 3% (18 employees); and transportation, 3% (17
employees). The least common industries in the dataset are: real estate leasing
and lending, 2% (8 employees); lodging and food services, 1% (7 employees);
other services, 1% (7 employees); mining, 1% (6 employees); utilities, 1% (6
employees); agriculture, less than 1% (2 employees); education, less than 1% (2
employees); and management, less than 1% (2 employees).
B. COVENANTS NOT-TO-COMPETE
Of the 532 employees studied, 66% (351 employees) were covered by a
post-employment CNC. This Subpart details the duration (length) and
geographic scope of these CNCs, plus the salary information for employees
covered by CNCs.
Figure 3 below reports the duration (length) of CNCs following
termination of employment.
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FIGURE 3. DURATION OF CNCS
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The most common duration of a CNC is one year, for a slight majority of
covered employees (52%, 181 employees), followed by two years as the next
most common (17%, 59 employees). In total, 86% of CNCs were for two years
or less. On the other end of the spectrum, 10% of CNCs (34 employees) were
longer than two years, with 5% (16 employees) who were subject to CNCs of
five years or more. In particular, owners or former owners of a business had a
longer-than-normal CNC, with a mean duration of 32.5 months.
Figure 4 below reports the geographic scope of CNCs.
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FIGURE 4. GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF CNCS
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Almost 40% of all CNCs (138 employees) either did not have an express
geographic limit or applied worldwide. 4% (14 employees) of CNCs applied to
the entire United States, while an additional 8% of CNCs (29 employees) applied
to the United States and at least one additional country (but less than the entire
world). 5% (16 employees) of CNCs applied to only part of the United States
(but greater than a single state), while 17% (58 employees) applied to one state
or less (local). 16% (55 employees) of CNCs applied anywhere the employer
did business. 5% (19 employees) of CNCs listed another geographic scope for
the CNC (for instance, within a certain distance of anywhere the employee
worked or serviced customers), and 6% (22 employees) of CNCs had an
unknown geographic scope (for instance, if the employment agreement was not
available).
The dataset also provided evidence to support the “California effect”—
namely, that employees in California are less likely to be covered by a CNC.224
Of the 532 employees in the dataset, 42 of them were subject to employment

224. One potential limitation on this finding is that employers—knowing that a noncompete covering a
California-based employee is likely invalid—probably will not sue to try to enforce it. As a result, employment
agreements with unenforceable noncompetes would be less likely to appear in our dataset. But even
unenforceable noncompetes may have an in terrorem effect that can decrease labor mobility. See Blake, supra
note 12, at 682 (“For every covenant that finds it way to court, there are thousands which exercise an in terrorerm
effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations . . . .”); see also Rachel Arnow-Richman, The New
Enforcement Regime: Revisiting the Law of Employee Competition (and the Scholarship of Professor Charles
Sullivan) with 2020 Vision, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 1223, 1252 (2020) (reviewing the relevant literature and
concluding that “in terrorem effects of noncompete agreements are not hypothetical”).
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agreements governed by California law. Only two of these agreements (5%)
contained a CNC.225 In contrast, of the remaining 496 employees with
agreements not governed by California law, 72% (349 employees) included a
CNC. This difference is statistically significant.226 Similarly, for trade secret
litigation filed in a federal court in California, only 18% of cases (9 out of 49)
involved an employment agreement with a CNC, compared to 71% (342 of 483)
of employment agreements in cases filed outside of California. Again, this
difference was statistically significant.227
Summary information regarding the annual base salaries (for instance,
excluding bonuses, sales commissions, stock options, or other forms of financial
incentives) of employees covered by CNCs is reported in Table 1 below.228
TABLE 1. ANNUAL BASE SALARY OF EMPLOYEES WITH CNC
Percentile
Salary
10%
$42,000
25%
$90,000
50% (Median)
$120,000
75%
$200,000
90%
$600,000
The median base salary of all employees covered by a CNC is $120,000,
with the 25th percentile at $90,000 and the 75th percentile at $200,000. Notably,
almost 30% of employees (19 of 65) subject to a CNC had an annual base salary
of less than $100,000, with 14% (9 of 65) having a base salary of $50,000 or
less. In sum, most employees covered by CNCs for whom base salary
information was available fell within the top 20% of all Americans in terms of
personal income, but CNCs also covered employees with base salaries as low as
$20,000 per year.
In terms of income by job types, Presidents and CEOs subject to a CNC
had the highest median base salary ($400,000), followed by other senior
management ($185,000). Technical and engineering staff subject to a CNC had
a median base salary of $82,500, and sales and customer service workers had a
median base salary of $85,000.229 Current and former owners subject to a CNC
had a median base salary of $225,000. Employees with other job types subject
to CNCs had a median base salary of $96,000.

225. In one of these cases, the presence or absence of a CNC could not be determined because the
employment agreement was not available. See Complaint, Insight Global, LLC v. Beacon Hill Staffing Grp.,
LLC, 2018 WL 6573081 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2018) (No. 17-CV-00309).
226. The p-value for both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests was < 0.001.
227. The p-value for both Pearson’s chi-square and Fisher’s exact tests was < 0.001.
228. Salary information was publicly available for 65 of 351 employees covered by a CNC. See supra Part
II.C (noting this issue).
229. Notably, 14 of the 15 employees (93%) that fell into this category had an employment agreement that
made them eligible for additional compensation, such as sales commissions and bonuses, meaning that these
employees’ total annual income was likely higher than their base salary.
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C. NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
This study also examined evidence from employment agreements
regarding the frequency and scope of NSAs. 90% of all employees (477 of 532)
in the dataset were covered by an NSA. More detailed information regarding the
frequency and type of these NSAs is listed in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2. FREQUENCY AND TYPE OF NSAS
Type
# Employees
% Employees
Customers Only
29
6%
Employees Only
Both Customers and Employees

86
362

16%
68%

No NSA
Unknown

45
10

8%
2%

In particular, 73% of employees (391 of 532) in the dataset were prohibited
from soliciting customers of their former employer, and 84% of employees (448
of 532) were subject to an anti-raiding clause (non-solicitation of other
employees). Not surprisingly, sales and customer service staff (84%, 162 of 192
employees) and current and former business owners (84%, 16 of 19 employees)
were most likely to be prohibited from soliciting the customers of their former
employer.
The duration of NSAs was similar to CNCs. Figure 5 below shows the time
length of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of customers of the former employer.
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FIGURE 5. DURATION OF NSAS FOR CUSTOMERS
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The most common length of an NSA prohibiting the solicitation of former
customers was one year (58%, 225 of 391 employees), followed by two years
(23%, 90 of 391 employees). Only 5% of employees (21 of 391) were subject to
an NSA that lasted longer than 24 months. At the other end of the spectrum, only
3% of employees (13 of 391) had an NSA of less than a year.
Figure 6 below shows the duration of NSAs prohibiting the worker from
soliciting other employees of the former employer (for instance, anti-raiding
clause).
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FIGURE 6. DURATION OF NSAS FOR OTHER EMPLOYEES
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The distribution of the duration of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of other
employees is very similar to that of NSAs prohibiting solicitation of former
customers. The most common length of an NSA prohibiting the solicitation of
other employees was one year (57%, 257 of 448 employees), followed by two
years (22%, 100 of 448 employees). Only 4% of employees (18 of 448) were
subject to an NSA that lasted longer than 24 months. At the other end of the
spectrum, 4% of employees (18 of 448) had an NSA of less than a year.
Interestingly, the data also suggests that firms use NSAs as a partial
substitute for CNCs for California-based employees. Of the 42 employment
agreements that were governed by California law, all of them (100%) contained
an NSA, compared to 90% of employees (440 of 490) with agreements governed
by another jurisdiction’s law. Similarly, nearly all cases (95%, 47 of 49
employees) filed in a federal court in California alleged a breach of an NSA.
Summary information regarding the annual base salaries (for example,
excluding bonuses, sales commissions, stock options, or other forms of financial
incentives) of employees covered by NSAs is reported in Table 3 below.230

230. Salary information was publicly available for 83 of 477 employees covered by a NSA. See supra Part
II.C (noting this issue).
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TABLE 3. ANNUAL BASE SALARY OF EMPLOYEES WITH NSA
Percentile
Salary
10%
$42,000
25%
$75,000
50% (Median)
$110,000
75%
$197,000
90%
$400,000
The median base salary of all employees covered by an NSA is $110,000,
with the 25th percentile at $75,000 and the 75th percentile at almost $200,000.
Almost 40% of employees (33 of 83) subject to an NSA had an annual base
salary of less than $100,000, with 20% (17 of 83) having a base salary of $50,000
or less.

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This Part first describes several implications from the results described
above. It then discusses possible directions for future research regarding CNCs
and other post-employment restraints on competition, as well as other
contractual clauses that may impact innovation.
A. IMPLICATIONS
First, the results reinforce findings from previous empirical research that
CNCs and other post-employment restraints on competition are frequently used
by employers to cover workers in “high-skill, high paying jobs.”231 Nonetheless,
the data also suggests that a substantial number of lower-wage workers are
covered by CNCs and/or NSAs as well. Specifically, approximately 15% of
employees covered by CNCs for whom salary information was available had an
annual base salary below the median U.S. household income.232 This is
consistent with the large-scale survey conducted by Starr et al., which found that
13.3% of workers who earn less than $40,000 per year report being currently
bound by a CNC.233 In particular, it raises questions about whether CNCs that
cover low-wage, lower-skill employees are being used to protect an employer’s
legitimate interests, or instead whether they are being improperly imposed “to

231. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 1.
232. See JESSICA SEMEGA, MELISSA KOLLAR, EMILY A. SHRIDER & JOHN F. CREAMER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2019, at 4 fig.1 (2020), https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-270.pdf (showing a median household income of
$68,703 for 2019). The annual base salary may understate employees’ actual income, however, as it does not
include any income from sales commissions, bonus, or stock incentives. See supra notes 222, 228 and
accompanying text.
233. Starr et al., supra note 2, at 6. In total, 33.0% of employees who make less than $40,000 per year report
being ever bound by a CNC. Id.
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exercise economic control over certain classes of employees” by limiting their
freedom of mobility.234
Second, the employment agreements studied suggest that the primary
limitation on the scope of CNCs is duration, rather than geography. Indeed,
nearly half of all CNCs studied were effectively worldwide in their geographic
scope.235 This was somewhat surprising, as the literature and case law on
noncompetes indicates that geographic limits often are significant in
determining whether a CNC is reasonable in scope.236 However, the absence of
a geographic limitation in many CNCs may better comport with our modern,
information-based economy. For example, even a small business may have a
national or global customer base via the Internet, so competition could literally
occur anywhere in the world.237 In addition, because CNCs are often used to
protect against the disclosure of trade secret or confidential business
information, a broad geographic scope may be appropriate, “because once an
employee has divulged a trade secret in any location[,] the likelihood that it will
become public knowledge available to immediate competitors is greatly
increased.”238

234. Narragansett Coated Paper Corp. v. Lapierre, No. C.A. PC 97-2842, 1998 WL 388400, at *2 (R.I.
Super. Ct. June 25, 1998); see also Ecology Servs., Inc. v. Clym Env’t Servs., LLC, 952 A.2d 999, 1004 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (affirming trial court decision to decline enforcement of CNCs against “clearly low level
employees” who were “not utilizing skills against whom covenants not to compete could be enforced”); BHB
Inv. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Ogg, No. 330045, 2017 WL 723789, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2017) (refusing to
enforce CNC for “a low-level employee with general knowledge and skills in swimming and swim instruction”
because “[h]e had no valuable insider information that could be used for corporate espionage”).
235. See supra Part III.B.
236. See DONALD J. ASPELUND & JOAN E. BECKNER, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW § 6:8 (2020 ed.)
(“Although sometimes characterized as preliminary considerations, area limitations are important ones. Area
limitations frequently appear in covenants not to compete.”) (footnotes omitted); Blake, supra note 12, at 675
(“The traditional dimensions of a [CNC] have been those of duration and geographic area.”); Whitmore, supra
note 24, at 489 (“When determining the enforceability of a [CNC], the court will examine many different factors,
the most prominent of which are thought to be the length of the time restraint and the breadth of the geographical
restraint.”) (footnote omitted); see also Arcor, Inc. v. Haas, 842 N.E.2d 265, 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding a
CNC “unenforceable because it contained no geographic limitation” and thus was effectively a “blanket
prohibition on competition”).
237. See, e.g., PrecisionIR Inc. v. Clepper, 693 F. Supp. 2d 286, 292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that a
CNC’s geographic limitation prohibiting competition anywhere in the United States and Canada was reasonable
because the employer “has clients and does business over the Internet”); Nat’l Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Wright, 2 F.
Supp. 2d 701, 708 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that a CNC that applied in any state where the employer conducted
business was reasonable in geographic scope because “[t]ransactions involving the Internet, unlike traditional
‘sales territory’ cases, are not limited by state boundaries”); see also Friese v. Fadner Media Enters., LLC, No.
FSTCV146021437, 2017 WL 1238436, at *6–7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2017) (“[T]he law has come to
acknowledge the inapplicability of geographic bounds to companies that do business on a national or
international basis. This trend is particularly applicable to a business operating on the [I]nternet.”) (citations
omitted).
238. Blake, supra note 12, at 679; see also id. at 675 (“Restraints mainly concerned with protecting
confidential information are likely to be inadequate if they contain any geographic limitation . . . .”); Universal
Engraving, Inc. v. Duarte, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152–53 (D. Kan. 2007) (finding a CNC with a worldwide
geographic scope to be reasonable because the employer’s “confidential information can be utilized through
using a computer to transport the information, thus giving the information an easy route to travel worldwide,
even if [the covered employee] did not move to another country”).
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In comparison, current CNCs are, on balance, shorter in duration than those
in previous empirical studies. Specifically, the most common length of a CNC
in this study is one year, with the vast majority lasting two years or less.239 In
contrast, the average duration of an enforceable CNC in the 1960s was over two
years.240 In industries where innovation is rapid, such as biotechnology, CNCs
that last more than a year may substantially impede innovation by effectively
sidelining highly-skilled employees and interfering with their ability to keep up
with ongoing change.241 In addition, if the anticipated duration of a trade secret
is short—for instance, if reverse engineering is common, or if other competitors
can be expected to learn or independently discover the secret on their own—then
CNCs of shorter duration may be appropriate.242
Third, the results in this study suggest that the “California effect”243 is
real—in other words, that firms with California employees are less likely to
include CNCs in their employment agreements. However, it also suggests that
that California employers are using NSAs as an alternative to CNCs in an
attempt to impose some post-employment limits on competition.244 This
suggests that policymakers who are considering legislation limiting the
enforceability of CNCs should also consider the potential anticompetitive
impact of NSAs as well.
Fourth, the dataset contains examples of CNCs that appear to be facially
invalid under current state law. For instance, even though noncompetes are
generally unenforceable under California and Oklahoma law,245 several
employment agreements with a choice of law clause for these states contain
CNCs.246 Even though these covenants are unenforceable, they nonetheless may
deter employees from changing jobs. As Cynthia Estlund has explained, “[e]ven
a manifestly invalid non-compete may have in terrorem value against an
employee without counsel.”247
239. See supra Part III.B.
240. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
241. See Graves & DiBoise, supra note 73, at 330 (contending that “[a] one-year non-competition covenant
is a substantial limitation on a skilled employee looking to find the most productive and innovative position
available”).
242. See Blake, supra note 12, at 678 (“[W]hen the confidential information known by the employee will
lose its business significance in a short period of time, that period sets the outside limit for the effective duration
of the restraint . . . .”).
243. See Bishara et al., supra note 1, at 15.
244. See supra note 57 (discussing the uncertain status of NSAs under California law).
245. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Employee Confidentiality Agreement Between AllCells, LLC and Jack Y. Zhai 3 (June 1,
2010), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Bo-iFCmJcgJ4XzmKyMUnG2HgvSKQphJp (including a one-year
noncompete clause and selecting California as governing law); Employment Agreement Between SOAProjects,
Inc., and Jayaraman Swaminathan 4–5 (July 7, 2008), https://drive.google.com/open?id=1RRC_kJuD2uk6305E8KuSeCeCpYf-2j2 (stating terms of employment, including a one-year noncompete law, and
selecting California as governing law); Employment Agreement Between Innovative Healthcare Systems, Inc.,
and Larry C. Winstead §§ 6, 13 (Jan. 1, 2008), https://drive.google.com/file/d/19oJDD1GO23wzt0RRPey9vhKDmlxyvx0/view (containing a three-year noncompete clause and selecting Oklahoma as governing law).
247. Estlund, supra note 208, at 423; accord Catherine L. Fisk, Commentary, Reflections on the New
Psychological Contract and the Ownership of Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 782–83 (2002) (noting
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Finally, the enactment of the DTSA has—perhaps inadvertently—opened
the doors of federal courthouses across the country to hear claims that employees
have breached post-employment restrictions on competition. As the Author
found in a previous study, the majority of DTSA cases also involve breach of
contract and/or employment law claims.248 Although breach of an employment
contract is ordinarily a state law cause of action, federal courts can exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these claims when they are part of the same “case
or controversy” as a federal law claim such as the DTSA.249 The alleged breach
of a CNC is often factually intertwined with a federal trade secrets claim under
the DTSA because one of the main purposes of a noncompete is to protect
against the disclosure of trade secret information to a competitor.250 As a result,
employment disputes involving CNCs and/or NSA are being swept into federal
court when, prior to the DTSA, they would have been heard in state court
instead.251
B. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are a number of potential directions for expansion of this study’s
empirical research into noncompetes and other post-employment restraints on
competition. First, the number of employee agreements studied could be
significantly expanded. This empirical study included slightly over 500
employment agreements that were identified in 689 cases, representing a single
year of trade secret litigation in federal court under the DTSA. However, the
entirety of trade secret litigation is much larger. For instance, Lex Machina252
recently released a module of over 9600 trade secret cases filed in federal court
since 2009.253 If these cases contain employment agreements with CNCs and/or
NSAs at a rate comparable to the current dataset, this would result in thousands
of additional documents for coding and incorporation into the dataset.
Second, the existing employment agreements (and any additional ones)
could be coded for more variables. For instance, employers in these agreements
could be coded based on size and location.254 In addition, employee job types
that some employers “may ask their employees to sign” contracts with unenforceable noncompete clauses,
“presumably counting on the in terrorem value of the contract when the employee does not know that the contract
is unenforceable”).
248. See Levine & Seaman, supra note 177, at 143 tbl.4 (finding that 70% of DTSA lawsuits also involved
a breach of contract claim).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005)
(explaining that § 1367(a) confers “broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same
case or controversy, as long as the action is one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction”).
250. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
251. See Dennis Crouch, DTSA as a Shoe Horn for Contract and Employment Law Claims, PATENTLY-O
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/04/contract-employment-claims.html.
252. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
253. Press Release, Lex Machina, Lex Machina Launches Highly Anticipated Legal Analytics Module for
Trade Secret Litigation (May 30, 2018), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machina-launches-highlyanticipated-legal-analytics-module-for-trade-secret-litigation.
254. Firm size information is available from a number of sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s Business
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could be coded into more granular categories. Employment agreements could
also be coded for information regarding the frequency and scope of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs). Furthermore, data regarding an employment
contact’s specified remedies for breach of a CNC, such as monetary damages,
liquidated damages, preliminary and/or permanent injunctive relief, attorney’s
fees, and court costs, could be gathered.
Another possible area for future empirical research from employment
agreements in trade secret litigation are other contractual terms regarding
innovation. For instance, based on the Author’s review, a number of
employment contracts contain provisions regarding the assignment of inventions
and patent rights. Some contracts also contain provisions regarding the
employer’s rights in other forms of intellectual property created by their
employees during the course of employment, such as copyrights and trade
secrets. In addition, many of the agreements included in the dataset also include
language regarding remedies in the event that the contract’s terms are breached,
such as liquidated damages clauses and provisions awarding attorney’s fees and
court costs to a prevailing employer. In short, employment agreements publicly
disclosed in trade secret litigation may prove to be a rich source of data regarding
other contractual obligations that may affect the creation and ownership of
intellectual property rights.

CONCLUSION
Noncompetes and other post-employment restraints on competition, such
as nonsolicitation agreements, are one of the most significant and important
issues not just in employment law, but in innovation policy and economic
development as well. In light of the theoretical debate regarding the normative
desirability of noncompetes, more data about the frequency, scope, and impact
of these restraints is needed to assist policymakers who are grappling with these
issues at both the federal and state levels.
This study makes a modest contribution to that effort by collecting and
reporting information regarding an original dataset of employment agreements
containing noncompetes and/or nonsolicitation agreements that have been
publicly disclosed in trade secret litigation. Based on this data, it appears that
the use of noncompetes by U.S. employers goes well beyond the C-suite and
often extends to technical and sales staff. In addition, although employees
subject to noncompetes often are well compensated, some lower-wage workers
are also subject to them. Furthermore, it appears that firms employing
California-based workers are using nonsolicitation agreements as an alternative
to noncompetes. Finally, the data and methodology used in this study can be
adapted to study a number of additional issues at the intersection of contract and
employment law and innovation policy.
Employment Dynamics data. See Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO), U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sbo.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2021); Business Employment
Dynamics, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/bdm/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).
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